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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm’s productive
asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure offo mal au-
thority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker actsas a
principal to some decision makers, while she acts as an agent in relation to certain
other decision makers. We study under which conditions decision makers decide to
exercise their own authority and to accept their superiors’ authority.
We distinguish two types of behavior within such an authority situation. First,
we investigate a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing the explicit, myopic
exercise of authority. We find that if monitoring costs are sufficiently small, such
explicit authority is exercised fully.
Second, we consider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to au-
thority even though such authority is not enforced explicitly. Again for sufficiently
small monitoring costs such latent authority can be supported as an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction: Exercising authority
In this paper we develop an alternative approach to modelling the use and enforcement of
formal authority within a given hierarchical production organization. We do not intend to
develop an alternative theory on the nature of the firm, but rather limit our investigations
to the nature of authority in a given formal authority structure that regulates the access of
agents to a productive asset.
In contemporary literature on the firm, the nature of authoriy in (hierarchical) produc-
tion organizations is a major field of investigation. Since th seminal contributions of Coase
[10], Simon [39], Williamson [41, 42], Grossman and Hart [16], and Hart and Moore [18]
the literature has mainly developed towards a theory of incomplete contracting which tries
to explain the formation of firms from theownershipover residual rights, i.e., rights that
are not contractible.1 One of the main limitations of this theory is that it mostly studies
situations with a rather limited number of authority relationships. Another problem with
this approach is the focus on ownership. As Rajan and Zingales[32] put it: “The property
rights view does not consider employees’ part of the firm because, given that employees
cannot be owned, there is no sense in which they are any different from agents who contract
with the firm at arm’s length”.
Following Rajan and Zingales [32] we place thecontrol of access to a productive asset
at the center of our investigations and, thus, of our model ofenforcing formal authority
within a production organization. We pursue an alternativeapproach, explicitly allowing
arbitrarily complex structures of formal authority relations using deterministic concepts
from noncooperative as well as cooperative game theory and the theory of social situations
(Greenberg [15]). We explicitly assume a given environmentconsisting of a fixed set of
agents2, a productive asset, and a structure of formal authority relationships between these
agents regulating the control of the access to the productive asset. We view such a for-
mal authority relationship as between a “superior” and a “subordinate”. The superior is
assumed to have the power to control the access of the subordinate to the productive asset.
Our formal theory is now based on three primitives:
(1) a description of the productive values that can be generated by the different teams of
agents that are generated through accessing the productiveasset,
(2) a structure of formal authority relationships which represents the distribution of the
power to regulate the access of individual agents to the productive asset, and
1For recent developments regarding the theory of incompletecontracting and its foundations we refer to
Maskin and Tirole [27] and Hart and Moore [19].
2Throughout this paper we use the term “agent” synonymously with the standard notion of an “economic
actor”. Hence, unless stated explicitly, an agent does not refer to an agent as in a principal-agent relationship.
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(3) a utility structure describing the preferences of the agnts over the different produc-
tion situations.
We give a short description of each of these primitives.
First, following the seminal work of Alchian and Demsetz [2], we assume that pro-
duction is in principle a collective effort. Teams of agentsaccess the productive asset and
generate a collective production value.3 Formally, the potential collectiveoutput valuesof
the different teams are represented by a cooperative game with transferable utility. This
is also the modelling principle of the literature quoted. Weassume that these productive
capacities are completely independent of the regulation ofa team’s access to the productive
asset of the firm. In that respect these output values only have apotentialnature.
Second, we introduce an arbitrarily complex structure of formal authority relationships.
Our main hypothesis is that one has to distinguish “authority” itself from the deliberate en-
forcement of authority, or “enforced authority”. Following Aghion and Tirole [1] we define
formal authorityof an individual as the formal contracted right of that indivi ual to control
the access of certain other individual agents to the firm’s asset. Hence, within a formal
authority relation we distinguish one superior and one subordinate such that the superior
has the right to control the access to the productive asset bythe subordinate. An agent is
usually a superior to one or more subordinates, but is herself possibly also a subordinate
to one or more superiors. In this regard individual agents wihin an authority structure are
“relative principals” as well as “relative agents” in the sen of a regular principal-agent
relation.
This implies that a team has to obtain some form of permissionfrom the superiors of
the members of the team before it has access to the firm’s productive asset. We assume
that such permission is only required if formal authority relationships are “enforced” by
the various superiors of members of the team. If authority isnot enforced, in principle such
authority has not to be granted.
Here, we define authority to benforcedwhen costs are incurred to monitor certain
subordinates with the aim to actually regulate or control their access to the firm’s asset.
When an individual agent — as a relative principal or superiorwithin the formal authority
structure — decides to enforce her formal authority over some f her subordinates, she
engages in monitoring to detect whether a subordinate pursues unauthorized access to the
firm’s asset. This implies that in principle enforcing authority is costly. If a subordinate
does not assume the objectives of the superior, the superiorcan ultimately sanction that
3To support the hypothesis that team production is collectiv, we quote Alchian and Demsetz [2], page
779: “With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either define or determineeach
individual’s contribution to this output of the cooperating units.” For a more elaborate discussion we also
refer to Hart and Moore [18] and Ichiishi [21].
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subordinate by firing him, i.e., the superior can deny that subordinate access to the firm’s
productive asset.
Throughout this paper we assume that the incurred costs of monitoring are uniform.
Furthermore, we do not complicate the model by assuming thatmonitoring is imperfect,
i.e., we assume that monitoring is perfect. This allows us tohandle the enforcement of
authority in a completely deterministic fashion and to analyze situations with an arbitrarily
complex authority structure. Extension to imperfect monitring are left for future research,
which requires the application of game theoretic models of incomplete and imperfect in-
formation.
Third, we introduce autility structuredescribing the motivations of the agents within
the firm. Our main hypothesis is that the individual utilities are completely determined by
the output values that are realized by the various teams of agents within the firm. Each
individual agent is assumed to participate voluntarily in these value-generating teams and
shares in these values. Now each individual agent assesses her position in such a situation
only on the realized output values of the various teams. Hence, we assume that the authority
structure itself has no direct externalities. It only has indirect consequences on the utility
levels generated through the enforcement of authority and the denial of certain agents to
access the firm’s asset.
Above we introduced the notions offormal andenforcedauthority. At the heart of our
study is the game theoretic analysis of the strategic decision making processes whether to
enforce the assigned formal authority or not. We recall thatt e concept of formal authority
is represented by the given structure of formal authority relations between the agents. For
each formal authority relationship it can now be decided whether it should be enforced
or not. In our framework the strategic enforcement of authori y is developed into two
fundamentally different fashions: theexplicit andlatentenforcement of authority.
Explicit enforcement of authority is the willful or strategic decision to enforce the for-
mal authority to control the access of a subordinate to the firm’s productive asset. As
indicated, this is done by monitoring the subordinate, possibly incurring monitoring costs.
Our model of explicit authority is developed as a non-cooperative strategic or normal
form authority game. Each individual agent selects which subordinates to monitor within
the formal authority structure. This leads to a certain structure of enforced formal authority
relations. Monitoring costs are taken into account and determine together with the proper-
ties of the utility function of the individual whether enforcing formal authority is profitable
for an individual or not. The resulting Nash equilibria describe the resulting individually
stable structures of explicitly enforced (formal) authority elationships. Under mild condi-
tions we show that complete exercise of formal authority is warranted under low enough
3
monitoring costs. This is as one would expect.
Latent authority is exercised if the (rational) subordinate voluntarily behaves as if his
access to the firm’s productive asset were monitored explicitly by his superior, even though
there is no actual monitoring taking place, and, thus, formal authority is not explicitly
enforced by his superior. Latent authority comes about in situations where rational sub-
ordinates take into account the abilities of a superior to exercise their formal authority
explicitly by engaging in monitoring. Obviously, under laten authority, social gains are
generated and, therefore, is socially preferable over explicit authority. The model of latent
authority can be considered to be a formal construction to explain the elusive concept of
“loyalty”.
The setup of our analysis is as follows. Within the formal structure of an authority situ-
ation consisting of the three concepts described above, we develop two models of enforcing
authority. The first model is founded on a very straightforward description of explicit mon-
itoring and leads to an understanding when the explicit enforcement of formal authority
takes place. The second model describes a more advanced standard of (boundedly) ratio-
nal behavior that results into latent authority. Our main results are valid under rather mild
conditions on the authority and utility structure.
The analysis of latent authority leads to some surprising insights. In case some formal
authority is not enforced explicitly, subordinates may acts if such authority is enacted
fully. This approach is based on the insight that superiors can induce states in which certain
subordinates are monitored. Sufficiently rational subordinates now correctly anticipate
under which conditions monitoring will be induced by their superiors. Given these correct
beliefs, all subordinates may voluntarily act as if they arefully monitored even though
that might not be the case. We show that if monitoring costs are sufficiently low, in the
equilibrium state subordinates will voluntarily submit tofull authority, i.e., a state of full
latent authority emerges. Hence, this approach provides analternative foundation for the
phenomenon that formal authority need not be exercised explicitly in order to be effective,
confirming the main insight from standard principal-agent theory which is based on the
analysis of much simpler authority situations.
These main insights for these two fundamentally different models of “real” authority
— in the sense of Aghion and Tirole [1] — are established undera single condition on
the utility structure denoted asdual monotonicity. This is a relatively mild condition on
the utility structure that is satisfied by most known solution concepts in cooperative game
theory. We provide a comparison of this condition to the wellknown monotonicity require-
ments from the literature on cooperative games with transferabl utility in Appendix B of
this paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop theconstituting elements of our
theory. In the third section we introduce our analysis of theexplicit exercise of authority
through the concept of a normal form authority game. Section4 is devoted to the analysis
of the latent exercise of authority. In Section 5 we give a comparison of both models.
Section 6 discusses some concluding remarks as well as the relationship of this approach
to the existing literature on authority or power in hierarchical organizations. Throughout
this paper the proofs of the main results are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Foundations of the theory
In this section we introduce the three primitives of our theory, discussed in the introduction.
These three primitive elements are collected into a so-called authority situation, which
gives a complete description of the agents’ output values, the formal authority relations
between the participating agents, as well as their preferenc s.
Our formal theory is founded on the theory of cooperative games with an authority
structure developed in Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [14], Derks and Gilles [11], Gilles
and Owen [13], van den Brink [7], and van den Brink and Gilles [8]. In this theory a
standard cooperative game with transferable utility is extended to incorporate hierarchical
authority relationships between the agents. Here we limit ourselves to the formal theory of
the so-called conjunctive approach introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [14].
Throughout the paper we letN = {1, . . . ,n} be a given finite set of agents, who engage
in productive activities and are collectively endowed withsome given, formal hierarchical
authority structure.
2.1 Team production
First we introduce a description of the productive capabilities of teams of agents in the
given setN seeking access to the firm’s asset. We base ourselves on the theory of Alchian
and Demsetz [2] on team production. As usual, we use the concept of a cooperative game
with transferable utility onN to describe the potential output values that the various teams
can generate by accessing the firm’s productive asset. The hypothesis that these potential
output values can be represented through a cooperative gameis also one of the principles
underlying Hart and Moore [18] and Ichiishi [21].
Formally, acooperative game with transferable utility— or simply agame— on N is
a functionv: 2N → R such thatv(∅) = 0. A game assigns to every team of agentsE ⊂ N
some potential output valuev(E)∈R that can be attained collectively by that team through
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accessing the firm’s productive asset. The collection of allgames on agent setN is denoted
by G N.
A gamev∈ G N is monotoneif for all E ⊂ F ⊂ N we havev(E) 6 v(F). Note that this
implies thatv(E) > 0 for all E ⊂ N. A gamev∈ G N is strictly monotoneif v is monotone
and for allE ⊂ F ⊂ N with E 6= F we havev(E) < v(F).
Since we consider these games to be descriptions of potential ou put values rather than
realized output values, it is natural to suppose that the agents have preferences over which
production situation they participate in. We assume that these preferences are completely
based on the (potential) output values that the various teams c n attain, and do not depend
on the authority relationships between the agents.
Formally, each agenti ∈N is assumed to be endowed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function ui : G N →R over all possible games. Now the composite functionu: G N →
RN defines autility structureoverG N. A utility structure describes the desires of the agents
in N. In the literature certain utility structures have a prominent place. (We refer to the
seminal work of Herstein and Milnor [20].) Roth [34, 36] has shown that the adoption of
certain risk-neutrality assumptions leads to the Shapley value (Shapley [37]) as the only
feasible vNM utility structure4. Here theShapley valueϕS: G N → RN is defined for every
agenti ∈ N and every gamev∈ G N by
ϕSi (v) ≡ ∑




In case of simple games, Roth [35] shows that the utility structure defined by this type of
conditions includes the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf [5]).5 The following properties of utility
structures are important in our analysis.
Definition 2.1 The utility structure u: G N → RN onG N satisfies
(i) additivity if for all v,w∈G N it holds that u(v+w)= u(v)+u(w), where(v+w)(E)=
v(E)+w(E) for every E⊂ N.
(ii) the null player property if for every v∈ G N and i∈ N with v(E∪{i}) = v(E) for
every E⊂ N, it holds that ui (v) = 0.
(iii) dual monotonicity if for every v,w ∈ G N such that there is an F⊂ N for which
v(F) 6 w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, it holds that ui(v) > ui(w) for
all i ∈ N\F.
4In the related literature on incomplete contracts the Shapley value has also been used in e.g., Hart and
Moore [18]. An implementation of the Shapley value is given by, e.g., Ṕerez-Castillo and Wettstein [29].
5We refer to van den Brink and van der Laan [9] for a complete discus ion of the properties of the
normalized Banzhaf value.
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(iv) strong dual monotonicity if for every v,w∈ G N such that there is an F⊂N for which
v(F) < w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, it holds that ui(v) > ui(w) for
all i ∈ N\F.
We remark that both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value satisfy ll properties given in
Definition 2.1. Additivity and the null player property are familiar concepts in cooperative
game theory. Dual monotonicity and strong dual monotonicity impose that agents are
envious of potential payoffs to teams of which they arenot a member. We study these two
properties more exhaustively in Appendix B. We restate strong dual monotonicity in a form
that we use throughout this paper.
Lemma 2.2 A utility structure u: G N → RN satisfies strong dual monotonicity if and only
if for all v,w∈ G N and i∈ N such that
(i) there is a team F⊂ N\{i} for which v(F) < w(F),
(ii) v(E) 6 w(E) for all E ⊂ N\{i}, and
(iii) v(E) = w(E) for all E ⊂ N with i∈ E,
it holds that ui(v) > ui(w).
Proof. The “only if” part is straightforward. The “if” part followsfrom repeated applica-
tion of the definition of strong dual monotonicity given in Definition 2.1. ¤
2.2 Authority structures
Next we consider the description of formal authority relations between the participants
in the production organization. Anauthority structureon N is a mapS: N → 2N that
assigns to every agenti ∈ N a setS(i)⊂ N of direct subordinates. The class of all authority
structures onN is denoted byS N.
Here we interpret an authority structureS∈ S N as that an agentj ∈ S(i) has to obtain
“permission” from agenti for any productive activity that he intends to undertake by him-
self or with other agents in a team, through accessing the firm’s productive asset. Therefore,
the setS−1(i) = { j ∈ N | i ∈ S( j)} consists of alldirect superiorsof i.
There are several interpretations of what the concept of “permission” might entail. We
limit ourselves to theconjunctive approach, developed in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink
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[14], van den Brink and Gilles [8], and Derks and Gilles [11], in which the induced au-
thority structure establishes complete control of the superior over her direct subordinates.6
Below we develop a description of this interpretation.
First we introduce some auxiliary concepts.
Let S∈ S N andE ⊂ N. We defineS(E) = ∪i∈ES(i) as the set of direct subordinates
of the agents in the teamE. Similarly, we defineS−1(E) = {i ∈ N | S(i)∩E 6= ∅} as the
set of direct superiors of the agents inE.
Thetransitive closureof S∈S N is the mappinĝS: N→ 2N which for every agenti ∈N
is defined byj ∈ Ŝ(i) if and only if there is a finite sequenceh1, . . . ,hk ∈ N with h1 = i,
hk = j, andht+1 ∈ S(ht) for all 1 6 t 6 k−1. The agents in̂S(i) are called the (direct and
indirect) subordinatesof i in S. Similarly, the agents in̂S−1(i) := { j ∈ N | i ∈ Ŝ( j)} are
called the (direct and indirect)superiorsof i in authority structureS.
Finally, we defineBS = {i ∈ N | S−1(i) = ∅} andWS = {i ∈ N | S(i) = ∅}. Here,BS
is the set of position inS that are undominated. They can be interpreted as the “executiv
officers” within the authority structureS. Similarly, the setWS consists of all powerless po-
sitions in the authority structureS. These positions can be interpreted as “non-management
positions”, and the agents occupying these positions can simply be indicated as “workers”.
Two basic properties of authority structures are used through t this paper:
Definition 2.3 An authority structure S∈ S N is called
(i) acyclic if i /∈ Ŝ(i) for every agent i∈ N, and
(ii) transparent if for every i∈ N it holds that S(i)∩ Ŝ(S(i)) = ∅.
Acyclicity requires that there are no formal authority cycles, which is a rather mild require-
ment. Essentially it implies that the organization structure is “top-down”.
The transparency condition implies that within the authority structure an agent is never
a direct superior of one of the subordinates of her subordinates, i.e., indirect authority
relations never coincide with direct authority relations.This condition therefore imposes
that the organization is “lean” and is not burdened with unnecessary authority relations.
We emphasize that neither acyclicity nor transparency imply that the authority structure
is hierarchicalin the sense that there is a unique position at the top of the structure, i.e., the
property that|BS| = 1. Hence, throughout this paper we work with very general authority
structures, possibly with multiple “executive officers”.7
6Alternatively, in thedisjunctive approach, developed in Gilles and Owen [13] and van den Brink [7],
the imposed authority structure consists of partial control in the sense that only the collective ofall direct
superiors can veto an action of a direct subordinate.
7Usually, one might have even in mind an authority structure that isstrictly hierarchicalin the sense that
it is acyclic as well as hierarchical. We use such structuresto illustrate properties in some of our examples.
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2.3 Authority situations
Next we combine the three primitive elements introduced previously. These are the pro-
ductive abilities — described by a gamev ∈ G N — with a formal authority structure —
described by someS∈ S N. Furthermore, all agents are endowed with an objective, de-
scribed by the utility structureu on G N. The combination of these elements is denoted as
an authority situation. Formally, a pair(v,S)∈ G N×S N is called agame with an authority
structureonN. A triple (u,v,S) with u: G N → RN a utility structure and(v,S) a game with
an authority structure, is called anuthority situationon N. We emphasize that the three
primitive elements making up an authority structure are assumed to be independent from
each other.
Definition 2.4 Let (v,S) be a game with an authority structure. An agent i∈ N is inessen-
tial in (v,S) if i ∈WS and v(E∪{i}) = v(E) for every E⊂ N. Furthermore, an agent i∈ N
is inessential in an authority situation(u,v,S) if i is inessential in(v,S).
An inessential agent is a null player in the gamev as well as an irrelevant member of the
authority structureS in the sense that he has no authority over any other agents.
Next we address how an authority situation can be evaluated.As mentioned we assume
throughout that each superior is in principle able to exercis full authority over her subor-
dinates within(v,S). If such full authority is exercised, a teamE ⊂ N cannot form without
the appropriate authority from all its superiorsŜ−1(E). Formally, a teamE ⊂ N is au-
tonomousin S if Ŝ−1(E) ⊂ E. We denote byΦS the collection of all autonomous teams in
the authority structureS.
If the teamE is not autonomous, it cannot freely access the firm’s productive asset and
attain its potential productive output value. However, we can identify the largest sub-team
that can freely access the firm’s asset. Formally,E’s autonomous partin S is given by
σS(E) = E \ Ŝ(N\E). So,E is autonomous if and only ifσS(E) = E.
Definition 2.5 Let (v,S) ∈ G N ×S N be a game with an authority structure on N. Its
restriction R (v,S) ∈ G N is defined byR (v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) for every E⊂ N.
The induced mappingR(·,S) : G N →G N is linear and incorporates the effects of exercising
authority over the positions of the agents in the authority relationshipsS.8 We illustrate the
introduced concepts with an example.
8Some of the properties of this mapping are investigated in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [14]. We
remark that similar approaches have been developed to analyze other restrictions on team formation. In
particular we refer to the seminal contribution by Aumann and Drèze [3] for situations with coalitional











Figure 1: The permission structures with Example 2.6.
Example 2.6 We discuss a situation with four agents,N = {1,2,3,4}, and consider two
games with an authority structure(v,S1) and(v,S2). The authority structuresS1 andS2 are
given byS1(1) = {2,3,4}, S1(2) = S1(4) = ∅, S1(3) = {4}, andS2(1) = {3}, S2(2) =
S2(4) = ∅, S2(3) = {4}. These authority structures are depicted in Figure 1. We letthe
cooperative gamev be given byv(E) = 3 if 4 ∈ T andv(E) = 0 otherwise.
We remark that authority structureS1 is not transparent sinceS1(1)∩Ŝ1(S1(1)) = {4} 6= ∅.
Hence, agent 1 dominates agent 4 directly, although 1 also dominates 4 indirectly through
3. On the other hand, authority structureS2 is transparent. Furthermore,
R (v,S1)(E) = R (v,S2)(E) =
{
3 if {1,3,4} ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Hence, the restriction ofv on both authority structures is the same. This is due to the fact
that there are superfluous relationships in non-transparent hi rarchies. Deleting these re-
lationships does not affect the restriction of a game. This is the case for the relationship
between agents 1 and 4 inS1.
Furthermore, Agent 2 is an inessential agent in(v,S1). Removing relationships with inessen-
tial agents does not affect the restriction either. (We alsorefer to van den Brink and Gilles
[8] for more elaborate discussions.) ¤
Next we address the question whether the restrictionR is an appropriate description of
the explicit enforcement of authority. The next theorem gives a normative justification
for its use. We identify the restrictionR as the unique mappingF : G N ×S N → G N
satisfying four regularity assumptions and one descriptive hypothesis. This descriptive
property, stated as 2.7(v), states that an agenti ∈N\WS “vetoes” her direct subordinatesj ∈
S(i) in the sense that the contribution of agentj to a team is non-trivial only if agenti herself
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is a member of that team. This exactly describes that a superior can deny a subordinate
access to the firm’s productive asset.
Theorem 2.7 A mappingF : G N ×S N → G N is equal to the restrictionR if and only if
the mappingF satisfies the following properties:
(i) For every(v,S) ∈ G N ×S N it holds thatF (v,S)(N) = v(N);
(ii) For every(v,S),(w,S)∈ G N×S N it holds thatF (v+w,S) = F (v,S)+ F (w,S);
(iii) For every(v,S) ∈ G N ×S N and i∈ N such that all j∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null players
in v it holds that i is a null player inF (v,S);
(iv) For every(v,S) ∈ G N ×S N and i∈ N such that v(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \ {i} it
holds thatF (v,S)(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N\{i};
(v) For every(v,S)∈G N×S N, i∈N, j∈S(i), and E⊂N\{i} it holds thatF (v,S)(E)=
F (v,S)(E \{ j}).
The proof of this theorem can be found with all other proofs inAppendix A. Without
proof we mention that the five properties in Theorem 2.7 are ind pendent, and thus this
axiomatization is proper.
The remainder of this paper discusses two game theoretic appro ches to the exercise of
authority in hierarchical organizations using the restriction R. In these approaches the
individual agents decide whether to exercise authority over th ir subordinates based on the
preferences of these agents as represented by the utility structureu.
Throughout this paper we consider a given authority situation (u,v,S) in which there
are no inessential agents. We make this assumption solely for notational convenience.
Without exception, our results can be restated to include inessential agents. We consider
which of the formal authority relations inS agenti ∈ N \WS chooses to enforce. Thus,
each agenti ∈ N \WS selects a subsetT (i) ⊂ S(i) of formal authority relations that she
decides to enforce. If each potential superior has selectedsuch a set of explicitly enforced
authority relations we arrive at an authority structure consisting of exactlyall explicitly
enforced authority relations. The resulting authority structure is an element in the following
collection of authority structures:
H(S) :=
{
T ∈ S N |T (i) ⊂ S(i) for every agenti ∈ N
}
. (2)
An authority structureT ∈ H(S) thus describes those authority relations that areenforced.
In comparison, the relations described byS−T ∈ H(S), where for everyi ∈ N we define
(S−T)(i) = S(i)\T (i), only have alatentor non-enforced quality.
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Our next result states that under certain regularity conditions, agents indeed prefer to
exercise as much authority as possible if it is costless to doso.
Theorem 2.8 Assume that v is a monotone game. Let h∈ N \WS and T∈ H(S) be such
that T(h) 6= S(h). Finally, let Z∈ H(S) be given by
Z(i) =
{
S(h) if i = h
T(i) otherwise.
Then:
(a) If utility structure u satisfies dual monotonicity, then uh(R (v,Z)) > uh(R (v,T)).
(b) If utility structure u satisfies strong dual monotonicity and R (v,Z) 6= R (v,T), then
uh(R (v,Z)) > uh(R (v,T)).
(c) Suppose that v is strictly monotone, S is acyclic, and u satisfies trong dual mono-
tonicity. If T(h) = ∅ or S is transparent, then uh(R (v,Z)) > uh(R (v,T)).
The proof of Theorem 2.8 is relegated to Appendix A. Theorem 2.8 forms the foundation
for further analysis of the enforcement of authority withina hierarchical organization.
3 Exercising explicit authority
In this section we analyze the decision-making processes ofmy pically rational agents
who decide which of their formal authority relations to enforce explicitly. We model this
by means of a non-cooperative normal form game.
Every agenti ∈ N \WS has strategy set given byΓi = {E ⊂ N |E ⊂ S(i)}. (Clearly,
for every worker j ∈ WS it holds thatΓ j := {∅}.) A strategyEi ∈ Γi describes those
subordinates over which agenti explicitly enforces her authority. LetE = (E1, . . . ,En) ∈
Γ := ∏i∈N Γi be a strategy tuple. Then the resulting authority structureis the one given by
TE ∈ H(S) with TE (i) := Ei for all agentsi ∈ N.
Since the explicit exercise of authority usually induces a cost to monitor these subordi-
nates, we introduce a fixed monitoring cost parameterc > 0. We impose that monitoring
any subordinatej ∈ S(i) by an agenti ∈ N\WS will cost c > 0. This leads to the following
formalization:
Definition 3.1 The authority game induced by(u,v,S) and monitoring cost parameter




with for every strategy tupleE =
(E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Γ
uci (E ) = ui (R (v,TE ))−c|Ei| . (3)
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For the authority gameΘc with monitoring costc> 0 we consider the standard equilibrium
concepts. A strategy tuplêE =
(
Ê1, . . . , Ên
)
∈ Γ is aNash equilibriumin Θc if for every












∈ Γ is a
modification of the strategy tuplêE in which agenti selectsEi and each agentj 6= i selects
Ê j . We denote byN (Θc) ⊂ Γ the set of all Nash equilibria of the authority gameΘc.
A Nash equilibriumÊ ∈ N (Θc) is calledstrict if for every i ∈ N and everyEi ∈ Γi








. The set of strict Nash equilibria ofΘc is
denoted byNs(Θc) ⊂ N (Θc).
For ease of notation we denote for every authority structureT ∈H(S) the corresponding
strategy tuple byE T =
(




, whereETi := T (i) for everyi ∈ N. Now the strategy
tupleE S refers to the complete exercise of authority within the given structureS.
Definition 3.2 An authority structure T∈ H(S) is (v,S)-equivalent if R (v,T) = R (v,S).
We denote byM(v,S) the collection of(v,S)-equivalent authority structures.
An authority structure T∈ H(S) is (v,S)-minimal if T is (v,S)-equivalent and
|T| = min
{∣∣T ′
∣∣ ∣∣T ′ ∈ M(v,S)
}
(4)
where|T ′| = ∑i∈N |T ′ (i)| is the total number of authority relationships in the authority
structure T′ ∈ H(S). We denote bŷM(v,S) the set of(v,S)-minimal authority structures.
We remark thatS∈ M(v,S) and thereforeM̂(v,S) 6= ∅ for any game with an authority
structure. Using these auxiliary concepts we are able to give a partial characterization of
the (strict) Nash equilibria of the authority game with costle s monitoring and dual mono-
tone utility structures. Nash equilibria under costless monitoring exist for dual monotone
utility structures, while forstrongdual monotonicity even complete characterizations can
be given. The proofs of the following two theorems are again relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.3 Let (u,v,S) be an authority situation such that u is a dual monotone utility
structure and v is a monotone game. Then:
(a)
{
E T |T ∈ M(v,S)
}










Next we address the (strict) Nash equilibria under costlessmonitoring and strong dual
monotonicity.
Theorem 3.4 Let (u,v,S) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone utility structure and
v is a monotone game.
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E T |T ∈ M(v,S)
}
.
We remark that the assertions of Theorem 3.4 are no longer valid if the utility structure is
merely dual monotone instead of strongly dual monotone. This can be illustrated by the
egalitarian utility structure ¯u given by ūi (v) =
v(N)
|N| , i ∈ N, based on the equal division of
the total output value of the grand coalitionN. The egalitarian utility structure ¯u is dual
monotone, but not strongly dual monotone. For any(v,T), T ∈ H(S), ū(R (v,T)) = ū(v),







E T |T ∈ H(S)
}
.
For sufficiently low monitoring costs we derive the following insight. A proof of The-
orem 3.5 is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.5 Let (u,v,S) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone utility structure and









It is evident that every minimal authority structure is transparent, i.e., there are no super-
fluous authority relationships in such structures. This immediately leads to the following
corollary of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6 If the utility structure is strongly dual monotone, the potential productive
output values are monotone, and the monitoring costs are sufficiently low, then the resulting
Nash equilibrium authority structures are transparent.
We illustrate this analysis by referring to Example 2.6. Letthe gamev and the authority
structuresS1 andS2 be as given. Then for any authority situation(u,v,S1) with the utility
structureu strongly dual monotone, the unique resulting Nash equilibrium authority struc-
ture for sufficiently low monitoring costs isS2. (In fact, S2 is the unique(v,S1)-minimal
authority structure.) Clearly inS2 neither the redundant authority relationship 14 nor the
ineffective authority relationship 12 are enforced.
4 Exercising latent authority
In the previous section we discussed the explicit exercise of authority. Next we consider
a more advanced form of reasoning on part of the agents in the aut ority situation. Under
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this type of advanced rationality there might result situatons in which superiors abstain
from the explicit exercise of authority, but in which their authority remains effective. Here,
even though authority is not exercised explicitly, subordinates might nevertheless perceive
a potential, or latent, threat that a superior is willing to exercise that authority explicitly and
incur monitoring costs if they do not voluntarily restrict their productive activities. Thus,
these subordinates might actas if authority was exercised explicitly. If such behavior
results, we talk aboutlatent authorityto distinguish it from explicit authority.
It is clear that such latent authority cannot be described properly by the game theoretic
structure introduced in the previous section. In those authority games the only way for
an agent to profit from her formal authority is to explicitly enforce it. In this section we
present an approach in which agents can choose to enforce authority explicitly as well
as not to enforce any authority at all. This allows us to definea quilibrium concept that
incorporates that the subordinates perceive threats that their superiors will enforce authority
relationships with them. Thus, the resulting equilibria describe outcomes that are based on
implicit considerations rather than explicit considerations. This approach is based on the
theory of social situations developed in Greenberg [15].
For every authority structureT ∈ H(S) we define the set ofpotential authorizersin T
by
ψ (T) = {i ∈ N |T (i) = ∅ andS(i) 6= ∅}
Here, the agents inψ (T) ⊂ N \WS are the ones who are undecided regarding the explicit
enforce of their authority. From this it might be clear that the set ofexplicit authorizers
in T can be introduced asψ ′ (T) = N \ (ψ (T)∪WS). Note that forS0 ∈ H(S) given by
S0(i) = ∅ for everyi ∈ N, it holds thatψ (S0) = N\WS andψ ′ (S0) = ∅.
To describe the ability of a superiori ∈ N \WS to enforce authority, we introduce an
auxiliary tool. Namely, as long as agenti does not enforce any authority, she still has the
ability to execute her authority over any subset of her direct subordinates. Hence, agent
i can induce from any authority structure in which she does note force any authority,
another authority structure in which she (partially) enforces the formal authority that is
assigned to her withinS.
The point-to-set mappingγi : H(S) → 2H(S) is theveto correspondencefor agenti ∈ N
onS∈ S N if
γi (T) =
{ {
TFi |∅ 6= F ⊂ S(i)
}
if i ∈ ψ (T)
∅ if i /∈ ψ (T)
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where for everyF ⊂ S(i) we defineTFi ∈ H(S) by
TFi ( j) =
{
T ( j) if j 6= i
F if j = i.
The multidimensional mappingγ := (γ1, . . . ,γn) : H(S) → 2H(S)×N is called theveto struc-
tureonS.
Let γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn) be a veto structure onS. It is obvious thatγ defines a configura-
tion that describes the exact enforce of authority within the boundaries of a given authority
structure. Remark that each agent inN \WS can announce only once over which subordi-
nates she is exercising explicit authority. Within the vetostructureγ we are now able to
construct equilibria that describe the stable states of thelatent exercise of authority. We
define for everyT ∈ H(S)
Λ(v,T) = {R (v,Z) |T(i) ⊂ Z(i) ⊂ S(i) for all i ∈ N}
as the set of all games that can potentially result fromT within (v,S).
Definition 4.1 Let (u,v,S) be some authority situation on N.
(i) A point-to-set mappingΣ : H(S) → 2G N is anauthority protocol for (u,v,S) if for
every T∈ H(S) it holds thatΣ(T) ⊂ Λ(v,T).
(ii) Let a monitoring cost c> 0 be given. An authority protocolΣc : H(S) → 2G N
is stable for (u,v,S) if for every T∈ H(S) it holds that w∈ Σc(T) if and only if
w ∈ Λ(v,T) and there is no agent i∈ ψ(T), authority structure T′ ∈ γi(T) and
w′ ∈ Σc(T ′) with
ui(w
′)−c|T ′(i)| > ui(w)−c|T(i)|. (5)
An authority protocol assigns to every authority structureT within Sa set of games that can
emerge within(u,v,T) given the formal authority structureS. In this respect an authority
protocol is a potential solution for the latent exercise of authority within (u,v,S).
From the definition, astable authority protocolis an equilibrium concept that describes
the latent exercise of authority within(u,v,S). Namely, it incorporates the individual in-
centives to explicitly veto subordinates. However, it formalizes the potential, or latent,
development of the exercise of authority, noth wit is actualized. Hence, it exactly formal-
izes the notion of aperceivedexercise of authority within(u,v,S). We remark that a stable
authority protocol satisfies the von Neumann–Morgenstern notio s of internal and external
stability. For convenience we indicate a stable authority protocol by SAP.
16
The next theorem addresses the existence of a stable authority protocol. It is shown
that there is a unique SAP for authority situations with a monot e game and an acyclic
authority structure. Moreover, if the utility structureu is strongly dual monotone, all direct
subordinates of agents that have not yet explicitly exercisd their authority actas if they
were monitored by their superiors. In particular, if no agent has explicitly enforced her
authority to monitor and veto, every subordinate actsas if all agents fully enforce their
authority. Hence, in equilibrium full latent authority is enforced. For a proof we again
refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 4.2 Let (u,v,S) be an authority situation such that v∈ G N is monotone and
S∈ S N is acyclic. Then:
(a) For every monitoring cost level c> 0 there exists a unique stable authority protocol
Σc∗ for (u,v,S).
(b) If the utility structure u is strongly dual monotone, then there exists a cost level
c∗ > 0 such that for every0 6 c < c∗ and every T∈ H(S) it holds thatΣc∗(T) =
{R (v,Z)} where Z∈ S N is given by
Z(i) =
{
T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T)
S(i) if i ∈ ψ (T) .
In particular, Σc∗ (S0) = {R (v,S)} for 0 6 c < c∗, where S0(i) = ∅ for every i∈ N.
5 The case of high monitoring costs
In this section we consider the consequences of higher monitoring costs for the explicit
and latent exercise of authority. We use a simple example to clarify some of these con-
sequences. A general analytical study is rather involved and therefore subject of future
research.
Throughout this section we consider a three agent situationw th N = {1,2,3}. Further-
more, we impose the authority situation(ϕS,v,S), where (1) the utility structureϕS: G N →
RN is equal to the Shapley value, (2) the formal authority structureS is given byS(1) =
S(2) = {3} andS(3) = ∅, and (3) the output valuesv is given byv(E) = 1 if 3 ∈ E and
v(E) = 0 otherwise. The authority structureS is depicted in Figure 2.
We develop the analysis of this authority situation in threesteps: explicit exercise of





Figure 2: The authority structureS.
5.1 The explicit exercise of authority
The strategies of the two agents 1 and 2 in the authority gameΘc are given byΓ1 = Γ2 =
{{3} ,∅}. Since agent 3 has no subordinates we treat the authority game as a two-person
game. For convenience we denote these two basic strategies asV = {3} (veto) andN = ∅
(no veto).






















u(N,N) = (0,0,1). The Nash equilibria for different values ofc are now represented in the
following table:
Cost level Equilibria Utilities
c < 13 N (Θ








c = 13 N (Θ

















3 < c <
1
2 N (Θ












c = 12 N (Θ






c > 12 N (Θ
c) = {(N,N)} u = (0,0,1)
So, if c < 13 or c >
1
2 there is a unique Nash equilibrium (both veto, respectively, not veto),
and for intermediate values there are multiple Nash equilibria.
5.2 The latent exercise of authority
Next we consider the latent exercise of authority and the corresponding notion of a stable
authority protocol. For convenience we denote byT1, T2, andS0 the authority structures
given byT1(1) = {3}, T1(2) = T1(3) = ∅ (only agent 1 enforces explicit authority over
agent 3),T2(1) = T2(3) = ∅, T2(2) = {3} (only agent 2 enforces explicit authority over
agent 3), andS0(1) = S0(2) = S0(3) = ∅ (neither 1 nor 2 enforce explicit authority over
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agent 3). ForS, T1, T2, andS0 we have
Λ(v,S) = {R (v,S)}
Λ(v,T1) = {R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)}
Λ(v,T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}
Λ(v,S0) = {R (v,S0) ,R (v,T1) , R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}
For any costc > 0 the unique SAP assigns to the full authority structureS its restriction
R (v,S) because nothing else can be induced from that situation. Forthe other situations
we distinguish three possibilities:










Σc∗ cannot assignR (v,T1) to this situation (agent 2’s payoff if he inducesS is 13 −c
which exceeds it payoff 0 in situationT1). So, Σc∗(T1) = {R (v,S)} with payoffs




3) (Note that agent 2 does not actually has to pay its monitoring
cost ifR (v,S) is played in situationT1). By a similar argumentΣc∗(T2) = {R (v,S)}





Now, suppose that in situationS0 the gameR (v,S0) with payoffs(0,0,1) is played.





3 )), the SAP cannot assign the gameR (v,S0) to situationS0 (agent 1’s
payoff if he inducesT1 is 13 −c which exceeds it payoff 0 in situationS0). Suppose
that in situationS0 the gameR (v,T1) with payoffs(12,0,
1
2) is played. Since agent





SAP cannot assign the gameR (v,T1) to situationS0. Similarly, R (v,T2) /∈ Σc∗(S0).
So, also in this situationΣc∗(S0) = {R (v,S)}. Thus according to the SAP, in situa-
tion S0 agents actas if both agents 1 and 2 enforce full authority over agent 3 with





• 13 < c<
1










3)), the SAP assignsR (v,T1) to this situation.




3) is played, agent 2
cannot induce a situation in which it can do better. So,Σc∗(T1) = {R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)}.
(Note the difference withc < 13 considered above in which onlyR (v,S) was stable
in this situation.) By a similar argumentΣc∗(T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}.
Now, suppose that in situationS0 the gameR (v,S0) with payoffs(0,0,1) is played.
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Since agent 1 can induceT1 to which the SAP assignsR (v,T1) (with payoffs(12 −
c,0, 12)), the SAP cannot assign the gameR (v,S0) to situationS0. Suppose that in
situationS0 the gameR (v,T1) with payoffs(12 −c,0,
1
2) is played. Since agent 2 can
induceT2 to which the SAP assignsR (v,T2) (with payoffs(0, 12 − c,
1
2)), the SAP
cannot assign the gameR (v,T1) to situationS0. Similarly, R (v,T2) /∈ Σc∗(S0). No





So, in this situationΣc∗(S0) = {R (v,S)}. Note that, although in the intermediate
situationsT1 andT2 the latent exercise of authority is different for the casesc> 13 and
1
3 < c <
1
2, for both cases in situationS0 agents actas if both agents 1 and 2 enforce





• c > 12: In a similar way as above, it can be shown thatΣ
c
∗(S) = {R (v,S)}, Σc∗(T1) =
{R (v,T1) ,R (v,S)} andΣc∗(T2) = {R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}. Finally, it can be determined
that everything is stable in the situation in which all authority is latent, Σc∗(S0) =
{R (v,S0) ,R(v,T1),R (v,T2) ,R (v,S)}.
• Forc = 13 andc =
1
2 intermediate cases apply.
5.3 A comparison
Comparing the Nash equilibria of the authority game and the stable authority protocol
describing the latent exercise of authority allow us to conclude that there is a difference
of the equilibrium utility levels whenc < 12. Namely, under explicit exercise of authority
the monitoring cost is actually realized, while this is not the case under the latent exercise
of authority. For13 < c <
1
2 even the attitude towards exercising authority is different, as
described by these equilibrium concepts.
Namely, in the Nash equilibrium of the authority game authori y is not enforced fully,
while under the SAP the agents act as if this authority is enforced fully if no agent has
announced whether it is going to enforce its authority. Thissignificant difference indicates
that if agents are myopic — as modelled in the authority game —, there would be no full
exercise of authority in equilibrium. However, a more advanced form of rationality on part
of the subordinates — as modelled by the concept of a stable authority protocol —, would
induce them to accept full (latent) authority.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of the nature of authority within a given firm,
described as a hierarchical authority structure with team production. We introduced two
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models of the exercise of authority in a framework includinga description of team pro-
duction, an arbitrarily complex authority structure of decision makers who are principal to
certain decision makers and agents to other decision makers, and a utility structure. The
first model addresses the explicit enforcement of authoritythrough costly monitoring. The
second model describes a latent form of the exercise of authority, namely the rational ac-
ceptance of authority even though this authority is not enforced explicitly.
We emphasize that at the foundation of our theory, we consider the question of owner-
ship of the firm’s asset to have no bearing on the study of the nature of authority. Indeed,
we base our modelling on the hypothesis that ownership and cotrol are fundamentally sep-
arated and that “control” is represented by the authority structure. Here decision makers in
the authority structure have delegated control over the firm’s asset in the sense that a deci-
sion maker can deny the access of her subordinates to the asset. This modelling principle
corresponds to observed practices; firms are either publicly traded or the owner exercises
his or her control through managers with delegated powers. In either case the question who
exactly owns the firm’s asset is of no consequence for the practices that result with regard
to the control of the firm’s asset. In our analysis there emerged two practices: directly or
explicitly exercised control and latently exercised contrl.
Finally, we emphasize that our model of the latent exercise of authority represents the
elusive concept ofloyalty of subordinates to the firm and its objectives. Indeed, as mod-
elled, at a higher level of rationality, intelligent subordinates voluntarily submit themselves
to the objectives of their superiors to avoid being subjected to enforced monitoring. This
standard of behavior can in this respect be interpreted as a gme theoretic formulation of
“loyalty”.
Relation to the literature
Our approach to the notion of authority is in line with the typology of authority relations
considered in Aghion and Tirole [1]. They distinguishformal from real authority within a
hierarchical production organization. Formal authority can be seen as the “right to decide”
while real authority is the “effective control over decisions.” In our theory the concept of
formal authority is represented by the given structure of formal authority relations between
agents. In our framework the notion of real authority is thenfurther developed into two
distinct forms:explicit andlatent.
Related is the distinction made in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [4] between formal (“the
organizational chart”) and informal (“the way things really work”) aspects of organizational
structures. They study the interaction between asset ownership (which they consider to
be formal) and relational contracts (which they consider tobe informal). The study of
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differences and interaction between formal and informal aspects of economic organizations
seems to be an important and growing topic for future research.
We emphasize that the formal authority structure of the hierarchical production orga-
nization in our model is exogenously given. Further research will be directed towards
endogenously determining the formal authority structure of the organization. In this paper
we restrict ourselves the question what game will be played within the organization given a
particular formal authority structure. And, thus, what real authority structures emerge en-
dogenously within the production organization. In this sense our model is complementary
to the literature that studies the endogenous formation of hierarchical authority structures
such as principal-agent models (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart [17] and Kessler [24]), mod-
els on vertical integration (see, e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian [25]), and models on
incomplete contracts (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart [16], and H rt and Moore [18, 19]).
As mentioned in the introduction, these models assume rather simple authority structures
while we allow for arbitrarily complex formal authority structures.
To study the formation of hierarchies, our model can be extended in various ways. One
extension is introducing risk as has been pursued by Prescott and Townsend [30] who study
how risk sharing can be a reason to form collective organizations. They study why these
collective organizations form by using principal-agent relations between these organiza-
tions and outsiders.
Beggs [6] uses techniques from queueing theory to determine the optimal structure of
hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. He studies how
the complexity of tasks influences the organizational structure. He explains why many
organizations have a hierarchical structure by the economies of skilled workers. Skilled
workers can make decisions without consulting other workers, while unskilled workers
need to ask (superior) more skilled workers for advice or approval. In our model, the skills
of different workers are not specified. Only their contributon in the production process is
characterized by the cooperative team production game, andtheir position in the authority
structure determines their formal authority which can be exrcised explicitly or latent. By
extending our model with differences in skills we can require that the implicit exercise of
latent authority is only possible if the subordinate workeris skillful enough to do the work
on its own. Unskilled workers always have to ask for explicitapproval.
Garicano [12] develops a similar model in which he uses specialization instead of dif-
ferences in worker skills. In a “knowledge-based hierarchy” easy problems are solved by
lower (production) levels, while more exceptional or harder problems need to be passed on
to higher levels. In his model the decision “who must learn what and whom each worker
should ask when confronted with an unknown problem” is part of the organization. We
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quote from Garicano [12]: “The organization is characterized by thetask design, as defined
by the scope of discretionality of production workers and problem solvers andstructure of
hierarchy, given by the span of control of problem solvers and the number of layers in the
organization”. Where our model takes the hierarchical organization structure as given and
explains which authority relations are actually activated, Garicano explains the formation
of hierarchies by a trade off between communication versus knowledge acquisition costs.
In our model (like in Beggs [6]) there is no distinction between different knowledge levels
necessary to perform different tasks. A future direction inresearch is to make this dis-
tinction in our model, and see what is the effect on the exercis of authority. One would
expect that more easy tasks are suitable to be performed under latent authority, while more
difficult tasks need more explicit authority.
Like our model, the above two mentioned papers set aside incentive problems since
(as Beggs argues) to get more insight in the functioning of hierarchical organizations it
is best to focus on one of many aspects. In this sense these modls are complementary
to the models which focus on incentive problems such as Qian [31] who endogenously
determines the number of hierarchical levels, the span of control and the wage scales by
using optimal control techniques, and in that way extends the seminal work of Keren and
Levhari [22, 23]. However, these papers do not address the question what authority is
actually exercised within a hierarchy.
Another aspect that we do not address here is the organizational f rm of a hierarchy.
Maskin, Qian and Xu [26] compare an M-form (multi-divisional form in which the organi-
zation goes along institutional lines) with a U-form (unitary form in which the organization
goes along regional lines) with respect to their effectiveness in giving incentives to man-
agers. In their terminology an organization is a “hierarchyof managers built on top of
technology” where the technology is present in productive plants. It would be interesting
to see if the games that are played within organizations are affected by their organizational
form. For example, we might consider the question whether lat nt exercise of authority
appears more often in M-form organizations (which each act more independent from each
other in their own region), while in U-form organizations authority is exercised more ex-
plicitly (because the stronger dependence between the different organizational units).
Another strand of literature that we mentioned earlier is the incomplete contracts liter-
ature which tries to answer the question how to distribute ownership over residual rights,
i.e., who has the authority over assets that are non-contractible. While the incomplete con-
tracts literature focusses on the ownership over residual rights to explain the formation of
firms, Rajan and Zingales [32] focus on the control of access tocritical resources. In this
respect we follow in our modelling a similar principle. Rajanand Zingales define access as
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“the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource”. We quote: “The agent who is given
privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is
the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make herself valuable.
When combined with her preexisting residual right to withdraw her human capital, access
gives her the ability to create a critical resource that she controls, her specialized human
capital, control over this resource is a source of power.”
Rajan and Zingales [33] develop this idea further by relatinghe control of access to
resources to specialization of employees (managers) and try to explain the formation of
(firm) hierarchies.9 This is in line with our model in which we explain the exerciseof au-
thority over subordinate employees. Assets are comparablewith positions in our authority
structure, and control over assets is exercised by vetoing the access to the productive asset
by agents in subordinate positions. Although their hierarchical structures are much simpler
than ours, also in their model different positions in a hierarchy have differentpositional
power. Where Rajan and Zingales [33] use positional power to explainthe formation of
firm hierarchies (by managers splitting off from a firm and by doing so constructing a new
firm), we use positional power to explain how authority is exercised (i.e. what game is
played) within a given hierarchical production organization.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the main results
Proof of Theorem 2.7
First, we show that the restrictionR indeed satisfies the five properties stated in the asser-
tion. LetS∈ SN andv,w∈ G N. SinceσS(N) = N it holds thatR(v,S)(N) = v(σS(N)) =
v(N), and thusR satisfies property (i). R satisfies (ii) sinceR(v+ w,S)(E) = (v+
w)(σS(E)) = v(σS(E)) + w(σS(E)) = R(v,S)(E) + R(w,S)(E) for all E ⊂ N. If i ∈ N
is such that allj ∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null players inv thenR(v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = v(σS(E)\
({i}∪ Ŝ(i))) = v(σS(E \{i})) = R(v,S)(E \{i}) for all E ⊂ N, and thusR satisfies prop-
erty (iii). If i ∈N is such thatv(E) = 0 for allE⊂N\{i} andE⊂N\{i} theni /∈σS(E) and
thusR(v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = 0, which implies thatR satisfies property (iv). Finally, prop-
erty (v) follows from the fact thatj ∈S(i) andE ⊂N\{i} implies thatσS(E) = σS(E\{ j})
and thusR(v,S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = v(σS(E \{ j})) = R(v,S)(E \{ j}).
Next suppose thatF : G N ×SN → G Nsatisfies the five properties, and letS∈ SN.
Consider the gamewT = cTuT with cT > 0, anduT the unanimity game ofT ⊂ N given by
uT (E) =
{
1 if T ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Property (i) now implies thatF (wT ,S)(N) = cT . DefineαS(T) = T ∪ Ŝ−1(T). We distin-
guish the following cases with respect toE ⊂ N,E 6= N:
• E ⊃ αS(T). Since for all agentsi ∈ N\αS(T) it holds that all j ∈ Ŝ(i)∪{i} are null
players inwT , property (iii) implies thatF (wT ,S)(E) = F (wT ,S)(N) = cT .
• E + T. Since for all agentsi ∈ T it holds thatwT(E) = 0 for all E ⊂N\{i}, property
(iv) implies thatF (wT ,S)(E) = 0.
• E ⊃ T,E + αS(T). Then there existi ∈ αS(T) \E and j ∈ S(i) ∩T. Properties (iv)
and (v) then imply thatF (wT ,S)(E) = F (wT ,S)(E \{ j}) = 0.
So,F (wT ,S) = R(wT ,S). The theorem then follows with property (ii) and the fact thatv
can be expressed as a linear combination of the unanimity gamesuT in a unique fashion.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.7.
Proof of Theorem 2.8
We proof each of the three assertions stated in the theorem.
(a) Let F ⊂ N be such thath ∈ F . Then for everyi ∈ F it holds thatZ−1(i) ⊂ F if
and only ifT−1(i) ⊂ F . From this it follows thatσZ(F) = σT(F). Thus, for every
F ⊂ N with h∈ F we have that
R(v,Z)(F) = v(σZ(F)) = v(σT(F)) = R(v,T)(F). (6)
28
Suppose thatF ⊂N is such thath /∈ F . ThenZ−1(i)⊃ T−1(i) for all i ∈ F , and thus
σZ(F) ⊂ σT(F). From the monotonicity ofv it then follows that for everyF ⊂ N
with h /∈ F it holds that
R(v,Z)(F) = v(σZ(F)) 6 v(σT(F)) = R(v,T)(F). (7)
These two properties together with dual monotonicity ofu establish assertion (a) in
Theorem 2.8.
(b) Together with the properties shown under (a),R (v,Z) 6= R (v,T) now implies
that there exists someF ⊂ N with h /∈ F for which it holds thatR(v,Z)(F) <
R(v,T)(F). Together with (a) and strong dual monotonicity ofu this establishes
assertion (b) in Theorem 2.8.
(c) Suppose thatv is strictly monotone and thatS is acyclic. Furthermore, suppose that
T (h) = ∅ or S is transparent. Then we show that there exists a teamF ⊂ N with
h /∈ F for which it holds thatR(v,Z)(F) < R(v,T)(F).
We now show that under these conditionsS(h) \ T̂ (h) 6= ∅. First, suppose that
T (h) = ∅. ThenT̂ (h) = ∅ and sinceh∈ N\WS it then follows thatS(h)\ T̂ (h) =
S(h) 6= ∅.
Second suppose thatSis transparent. Now, we proceed by contradiction and assume
thatS(h)\ T̂ (h) = ∅. ThenS(h)⊂ T̂ (h) and, thus,∅ 6= S(h)\T (h)⊂ T̂ (T (h))⊂
Ŝ(T (h)) ⊂ Ŝ(S(h)), implying thatS(h)∩ Ŝ(S(h)) 6= ∅. This contradicts the trans-
parency ofS.










Remark thatS(h)\ T̂ (h) 6= ∅ implies thatF 6= ∅. SinceS is acyclic,T ∈ H(S) is
acyclic as well. This implies thath /∈ F . Furthermore,σT (F) = F ∈ ΦT . Thus,
sincev is strictly monotone andF 6= ∅, it follows thatR (v,T)(F) = v(F) > 0.




sinceh /∈ F . Hence, sinceS(h)\
T̂ (h) 6= ∅, σZ (F) 6= F , and thus by strict monotonicity ofv it holds that
R (v,Z)(F) = v(σZ (F)) < v(F) = R (v,T)(F) . (9)
Assertion (c) of Theorem 2.8 now follows with assertions (a)and (b) shown above
and the strong dual monotonicity of the utility structureu in combination with
Lemma 2.2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.8.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Throughout this proof we letESi := S(i), i ∈ N, defineE








T ( j) for j 6= i
S(i) for j = i.
By definition of the restrictionR and monotonicity ofv it now can be concluded
thatR (v,Z) = R (v,S) = R (v,T). Hence,Z ∈ M(v,S).




be given, whereEi ⊂ S(i) is arbitrary. From dual mono-
tonicity of u, Theorem 2.8(a), and the definition ofM(v,S) it now follows for agent




T) = ui (R (v,T)) = ui (R (v,Z)) > ui (R (v,TE )) = u0i (E ) .
Hence, sincei ∈ N andEi ⊂ S(i) are arbitrary,E T ∈ N (Θ0).
(b) LetE ∈Ns(Θ0) and suppose thatE 6= E S. Then there exists somej ∈ N with E j Ã
S( j). Now considerE :=
(
E− j ,S( j)
)
, then by dual monotonicity and Theorem




> u0i (E ). This contradicts the strict Nash condition for





This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4
We develop the proof of Theorem 3.4 through a sequence of intermediate results. These
lemmas are put together to form a proof of the assertions stated in the two main theorems.
Throughout this and the next subsection we let(v,S) be a game with an authority structure
such thatv is monotone.






Proof. If T /∈M(v,S) then there existj ∈ N, h∈ Ŝ−1( j)\ T̂−1( j) andH ⊂ N with ∆v(H) 6=
0, H ∩ T̂(h) = ∅ andH ∩ T̂( j) 6= ∅. (If such a j,h andH would not exist thenR (v,T) =
R (v,S) and thusT ∈ M(v,S).) But then there exists a sequence of agentsh1, . . . ,hp such
thath1 = j, hp = h, hk ∈ S(hk+1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p−1}, and j /∈ T̂(hk) for at least one
k∈ {2, . . . , p}. Let m∈ {2, . . . , p} be the lowest label for whichj /∈ T̂(hm) and there exists
H ⊂ N with ∆v(H) 6= 0,H ∩ T̂(hm) = ∅ andH ∩ T̂( j) 6= ∅. (Note that such a label exists
because it holds for labelp.) Then, forZ ∈ H(S) given by
Z(i) =
{
T (i) for i 6= hm
T(hm)∪{hm−1} for i = hm,
it holds thatR (v,Z) 6= R(v,T). SinceR (v,Z)(E) 6 R(v,T)(E) for all E ⊂ N, and
R (v,Z)(E) = R(v,T)(E) for all E ⊂ N with hm ∈ E, it follows from strong dual mono-





The next lemma discusses situations in which the full authority structureSis (v,S)-minimal.
Lemma A.2 Let u be a strongly dual monotonic utility structure and letS∈ M̂(v,S). Then
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(a) E S∈ Ns(Θ0), and





Proof. Under the assumptions, by definition,M̂(v,S) = M(v,S) = {S}.




, whereEi Ã S(i) is arbitrary as well. The
resulting authority structure is given byTE /∈ M(v,S). Hence,R (v,TE ) 6= R (v,S).






= ui (R (v,S)) > ui (R (v,TE )) = u
0
i (E ) .
Hence,E S∈ Ns(Θ0).
(b) This assertion follows from Lemma 6 and the fact thatS∈ M̂(v,S) implies that
T /∈ M(v,S) for all T ∈ H(S) with T 6= S.
This shows Lemma A.2. ¤
Now Theorem 3.4(a) follows immediately from Proposition 3.3(b) and Lemma A.2. Next
we turn to the proof of assertion 3.4(b).






E T |T ∈ M(v,S)
}
is a
simple consequence of the properties given in Proposition 3.3(a) and Lemma A.1.
It remains to be shown thatNs(Θ0) = ∅. From Proposition 3.3(b) it only remains to
be shown thatE S is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Namely, by assumption there xists
someT ∈ M(v,S) with T 6= S. Then it follows that there is somej ∈ N with T ( j) Ã S( j).
Consider the authority structureZ given by
Z(i) =
{
S(i) if i 6= j
T ( j) if i = j.
From a repeated application of Theorem 2.8(a) it can be concluded thatR (v,Z) = R (v,S),
i.e., Z ∈ M(v,S). Now it can immediately be concluded thatE S cannot be a strict Nash
equilibrium of the authority gameΘ0. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.5
Lemma A.3 Let u be a strongly monotone utility structure. For every(v,S)-minimal au-
thority structureT ∈ M̂(v,S) there exists a cost levelcT > 0 such thatET ∈ N(Θc) for
every0 6 c 6 cT .
Proof. Let T ∈ M̂(v,S) be (v,S)-minimal. Then by Theorem 2.8(a) and (b) we have for

















for any agentj ∈ N. Now define forj ∈ N\WS












− j ,E j
)
∣∣∣∣∣
E j ⊂ S( j) such that
R (v,S) 6= R
(
v,T(E T− j ,E j)
)
}





∣∣∣∣ j ∈ N\WS with δ j > 0
}
> 0. (10)




with Ei ⊂ S(i). Now we consider two cases:
Case A R (v,T) = R (v,TE )
Then by definition of(v,S)-minimality of T it follows that |T (i)| 6 |Ei|. Hence for




T)−uci (E ) = u0i
(
E
T)−u0i (E )+c(|Ei|− |T (i)|)
= c(|Ei|− |T (i)|) > 0.
Case B R (v,T) 6= R (v,TE )














T)−uci (E ) = u0i
(
E
T)−u0i (E )+c(|Ei|− |T (i)|)
> δi −cT |T (i)| > 0.
Cases A and B now complete the proof of the assertion stated in Lemma A.3. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Consider anyE ∈ Γ such thatTE /∈ M̂(v,S). We now distinguish
two possible cases:
Case A: TE /∈ M(v,S)




. Hence, there exists somejE ∈ N \WS with
u0jE (E ) < u
0
jE
(E ′), whereE ′ =
(
































> (cE −c) |S( jE )| > 0.
Thus,E /∈ N (Θc).
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Case B: TE ∈ M(v,S)




. SinceTE /∈ M̂(v,S), we conclude
from the definition of the restrictionR that there exists somêT ∈ M̂(v,S) with∣∣∣T̂ (i)
∣∣∣ 6 |TE (i)| for all i ∈ N and
∣∣∣T̂ ( j)
∣∣∣ < |TE ( j)| for some j ∈ N \WS. Also from































Hence,E /∈ N (Θc).






∪{cE |E ∈ Γ with TE /∈ M(v,S)} > 0.
Now for any 0< c < c∗ it follows that





⊂ N (Θc), and






This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.5. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is based on results from the theory ofsocial situations, developed
in Greenberg [15]. Greenberg develops the notion of astable standard of behavioras the
main equilibrium concept within this theory. In this proof we transform our notion of a
stable authority protocol into a stable standard of behavior of an appropriately constructed
social situation. The proof of the existence of the SAP then bcomes a straightforward
application of the main existence theorem developed by Greenberg.
Let (u,v,S) and c > 0 be as in Theorem 4.2. Hence,v ∈ G N is a monotone game
and S∈ S N is an acyclic authority structure. Furthermore,(u v,S) does not have any
inessential agents. We now construct a social situation from (u,v,S). (For an exhaustive
discussion and definition of a social situation we refer to Chapter 2 in Greenberg [15], in
particular Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.)
First, for everyT ∈ H(S) we define
XT =
{
R (v,Z) ∈ G N
∣∣Z ∈ H(S) andZ(i) = T (i) for all i ∈ ψ ′ (T)
}
,
for every i ∈ N the restricted utility functionf Ti : X
T → R is for everyw ∈ XT given by




γi (T) if E = {i}
∅ otherwise
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whereγi is the veto correspondence for agenti ∈ N.
We remark that these definitions imply that every agent can annou ce to enforce her









situation introduced by Greenberg [15]. We now develop the proof of Theorem 4.2 through
a series of intermediate results.
From the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior10 (OSSB) and a
stable authority protocol the next lemma follows trivially. A proof is therefore omitted.
Lemma A.4 Any OSSB of the social situationϒc corresponds to an SAP for(u,v,S).
Furthermore, any SAP for(u,v,S) corresponds to an OSSB of social situationϒc.
The set of positions inϒc corresponds to the set of authority structuresH(S) in the author-
ity situation. For the next lemma we remark that the notions of hierarchical and strictly
hierarchical social situations are given in Definitions 5.1.1 and 5.3.2 in Greenberg [15].
Lemma A.5 The social situationϒc is strictly hierarchical.
Proof. Let n0 := |N\WS| and let for everyk∈ {0,1, . . . ,n0}
Pk := {T ∈ H(S) | |ψ (T)| = n0−k} .
Clearly,P0 = {S0} andPn0 = {T ∈ H(S) |T (i) 6= ∅ for i ∈ N\WS}. Now, the collection
{P0, . . . ,Pn0} forms a partition ofH(S). Also, from aboveγT (E,w) = ∅ for all E ⊂ N and
w∈ XT if T ∈ Pn0.
Let k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n0−1} and takeT ∈ Pk. Then for everyi ∈ ψ (T) andw ∈ XT obvi-
ously γT ({i} ,w) ⊂ Pk+1, since|ψ (T ′)| = |ψ (T)|−1 for T ′ ∈ γT ({i} ,w). Furthermore,















is indeed a social situation. Hence, we conclude thatϒ satisfies requirement H.1 of Defini-
tion 5.1.1 in Greenberg [15], pages 43–44. Furthermore, requi ment H.2 of that definition
is satisfied as well byϒc. So,ϒc is indeed hierarchical.
Finally we observe that there is noE ⊂ N andw∈ XT for whichT ∈ γT (E,w). Hence,ϒc
satisfies Definition 5.3.2 in Greenberg [15], page 52. ¤
The next lemma follows immediately from Lemma A.5 and Corollary 5.3.3 in Greenberg
[15], page 52. A proof is therefore omitted.
Lemma A.6 The social situationϒc admits a unique OSSBσc∗ : H(S) → 2X
T
.
Assertion (a) of Theorem 4.2 now follows immediately from Lemmas A.4 and A.6. To
show assertion (b) as well, we define forT ∈ H(S) andh ∈ ψ(T) the authority structure
Th ∈ H(S) by
10For the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior, or OSSB, we again refer to Green-




T (i) if i ∈ N\{h}
S(i) if i = h,
andπ(T) = {h∈ ψ(T) |uh(R (v,Th))−uh(R (v,T)) > 0}.
Lemma A.7 Let the utility structureu be strongly dual monotone, let there be at least one
agent i ∈ N with S(i) 6= ∅, and letc := minT∈H(S),h∈π(T){uh(R (v,Th))− uh(R (v,T))}.
For c∗ := cmaxi∈N |S(i)| it then follows that
1. c∗ > 0, and
2. c∗ = 0 if and only if R (v,T) = R (v,S) for.all T ∈ H(S) .
Proof. From the definition ofc∗ the fact thatu satisfies strong dual monotonicity, and
Theorem 2.8(a) it immediately follows thatc∗ > 0.
It is also easy to see thatc∗ = c = 0 if R (v,T) = R (v,S) for all T ∈ H(S) .
Now suppose thatR (v,T) 6= R (v,S) for someT ∈ H(S) . Then there exists aT ∈ H(S)
andh∈ ψ(T) such thatR (v,Th) 6= R (v,T). Sinceu satisfies strong dual monotonicity it
follows from Theorem 2.8(b) thatuh(R (v,Th))− uh(R (v,T)) > 0. But thenc > 0, and
thusc∗ > 0. ¤
Our final step in the proof of assertion (b) in Theorem 4.2 is the following:
Lemma A.8 Let the utility structureu be strongly dual monotone and let the monitoring
cost satisfyc < c∗, wherec∗ is as defined in Lemma A.7. Then for everyT ∈ H(S) the




T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T)
S(i) if i ∈ ψ (T) .
Proof. The proof consists of two steps, constituting a proof by induction on the partition
discussed in the proof of Lemma A.5.
First, letT ∈ Pn0. Using the notion of the Optimistic Dominion given in Greenbrg [15],
page 19, and Greenberg [15] Definition 2.4.7 plus the fact that γT (E,w) = ∅ for all E ⊂ N
andw∈ XT , we compute the unique OSSB forϒc to be given by
σc∗ (T) = XT = {R (v,Z) |Z ∈ H(S) andZ(i) = T (i) , i ∈ N} .





Z(i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z(i) = S(i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}





Z(i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z(i) = S(i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}
35
Let T ∈ Pk−1. Chooseh∈ ψ (T) and letZ ∈ H(S) be given by
Z(i) =
{
S(i) if i = h
T (i) otherwise.
Note thatT (h) = ∅. Since,u is strongly dual monotone, it follows by definition ofc∗
thatuh(R (v,Z))−uh(R (v,T)) >
c
|S(h)| > c
∗ if R (v,Z) 6= R (v,T). SinceR (v,Z) ∈ XT ∩






Z(i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z(i) = S(i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}
From Theorem 2.8(b) it also follows that this inclusion can be reversed as well. This shows
the assertion. ¤
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2 we remark that from LemmaA.8 it can immediately
be concluded that for 06 c < c∗ it holds that
Σc∗ (S0) = σc∗ (S0) = {R (v,Z) |Z(i) = S(i) for i ∈ N} = {R (v,S)} .
Hence, we have established assertion (b) of Theorem 4.2. Since we already established
assertion (a), we have completed the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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Appendix B: Regarding dual monotonicity
From the analysis in this paper we conclude that the dual monotonicity condition on the
utility structure is of great significance. For both explicit as well as latent exercise of
authority, the dual monotonicity and strong dual monotonicity properties introduced in
Definition 2.1 are identified as the main hypotheses under which complete control of access
to the productive asset is established. In this appendix we inv stigate the (strong) dual
monotonicity properties and compare them to some more famili r monotonicity concepts
from the literature. Our main insight is that the dual monotoicity concept is not stronger
than the monotonicity concepts used in the literature.
First, we compare our dual monotonicity concepts with the notio of strong mono-
tonicity discussed in Young [43]. A utility structureu: G N → RN satisfiesYoung’s strong
monotonicityproperty if for everyv,w∈ G N andi ∈ N it holds thatui(v) > ui(w) whenever
v(E∪{i})−v(E) > w(E∪{i})−w(E) for all E ⊂ N\{i}.
Proposition B.1 If u: GN → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity property, then it
satisfies dual monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose thatu: G N → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity and letv,w∈ G N
satisfy the condition stated in Definition 2.1.3, i.e., for smeF ⊂ N it holds thatv(F) 6
w(F) and for all other teamsE ∈ 2N \{F} it holds thatv(E) = w(E). For everyi ∈ N\F
it then holds thatv(F ∪{i})− v(F) > w(F ∪{i})−w(F) andv(E∪{i})− v(E) = w(E∪
{i})−w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}.
From Young’s strong monotonicity ofu it then follows thatui(v) > ui(w). Thus,u satisfies
dual monotonicity. ¤
Dual monotonicity does not imply Young’s strong monotonicity property as the following
example shows.
Example B.2Let u: G N → RN be the egalitarian utility structure given byui(v) =
v(N)
n for
all i ∈ N. Obviously the utility structureu is dual monotone.
Consider the gamesv,w∈ G N with N = {1,2,3} given byv(E) = |E| for all E ⊂ N, and
w(E) = 1 if 1∈E, andw(E) = 0 otherwise. Thenv(E∪{1})−v(E) = w(E∪{1})−w(E)
for all E ⊂ N\{1}. But u1(v) = 1 > 13 = u1(w). This shows thatu indeed does not satisfy
Young’s strong monotonicity property. ¤
A utility structureu: G N → RN satisfiescoalitional monotonicityif for every v,w ∈ G N
such that there is anF ⊂ N for whichv(F) > w(F), andv(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F},
it holds thatui(v) > ui(w) for all i ∈ F . Coalitional monotonicity has been considered by
Shubik [38] and in some sense can be perceived as a dual formulation of dual monotonicity.
The following example shows that in general these two properties do not imply one another.
Example B.3Let gi(v) = max{maxE3i v(E),0} for all i ∈ N andv∈ G N, and letG(v) =
∑i∈N gi(v) > 0.
Let the utility structureu: G N → R distribute the worthv(N) proportional to the values
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gi(v) over the agents ifG(v) > 0, and according to the egalitarian rule that is considered in




G(v) v(N) if G(v) > 0
v(N)
n if G(v) = 0.
This utility structure satisfies dual monotonicity but doesnot satisfy coalitional monotonic-
ity. Consider the gamesv,w∈ G N with N = {1,2,3} given by
v(E) =
{




1 if E = {1}
0 otherwise.
Thenv({1,2}) > w({1,2}) andv(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {{1,2}}. But u1(v) = 12 <
1 = u1(w).
Similarly, by takinggi(v) = max{minE, i∈E v(E),0} it can be shown that coalitional mono-
tonicity does not imply dual monotonicity. ¤
It turns out that dual and coalitional monotonicity are equivalent under the assumption that
the utility structure satisfies additivity and the null player property.
Proposition B.4Let the utility structureu: GN → RN satisfy additivity and the null player
property. Thenu satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional mono-
tonicity.
Proof. Let u: G N → RN satisfy additivity and the null player property. Accordingto The-
orem 3 in Weber [40] it then holds that for everyi ∈ N there exists a collection of constants
piE, E ⊂ N\{i}, such that (i)∑E⊂N\{i} p
i
E = 1, and (ii)ui(v) = ∑E⊂N\{i} p
i
E(v(E∪{i})−
v(E)) for everyv∈ G N.
We now show thatu satisfies dual monotonicity if and only ifpiE > 0 for all i ∈ N and
E ⊂ N\{i}.
Only if
Suppose thatu satisfies dual monotonicity. Leti ∈ N, F ⊂ N\{i}, and letv∈ G N be such
thatv(F) 6 v0(F) andv(E) = v0(E) for all E ∈ 2N \{F}, wherev0 denotes the null game,
i.e.,v0(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N.
From Weber’s result it follows thatui(v) = piF(v(F ∪ {i})− v(F)). According to dual
monotonicity and the null player property it holds thatui(v) > ui(v0) = 0. Sincev(F ∪
{i})−v(F) > 0 it must hold thatpiF > 0.
If
Suppose thatpiE > 0 for all i ∈ N andE ⊂ N \ {i}. Let v,w ∈ G
N satisfy the condition
stated in Definition 2.1.3 for teamF ⊂ N, and leti ∈ N \F . Further, letw′ ∈ G N be given
by w′(E) = w(E)−v(E) for all E ⊂ N.
Since piF ≥ 0, w
′(F ∪ {i}) = 0, andw′(F) > 0 it holds thatui(w′) = piF(w
′(F ∪ {i})−
w′(F)) 6 0.
Sinceu satisfies additivity andw= v+w′ it holds thatui(w) = ui(v)+ui(w′) 6 ui(v). Thus,
u satisfies dual monotonicity.
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In a similar fashion it can be shown thatu satisfies coalitional monotonicity if and only if
piE > 0 for all i ∈ N andE ⊂ N \ {i}. Combining these two equivalence properties yields
thatu satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional monotonicity. ¤
In the previous sections we also used strong dual monotoniciy in our analysis. A utility
structureu: G N → RN satisfies this property if it satisfies the dual monotonicityondition
stated with the inequalities replaced by strict inequalities. (This is stated in Definition 2.1
(iv).) Similarly we can replace the inequalities in the definitio s of strong and coalitional
monotonicity by strict inequalities. Propositions B.1 and B.4 also hold if we replace the
monotonicity concepts by these strict monotonicity concepts.
It is easy to see that, for example, all utility structuresu: G N → RN for which there are
constantspk > 0, 06 k6 n, such that for everyv∈G N it holds thatui(v)= ∑E⊂N p|E|(v(E∪
{i})− v(E)), satisfy strong dual monotonicity as well as strong coalitional monotonic-
ity. Familiar examples of such solution concepts are the Shapley value, for whichpk =
(k−1)!(n−k)!
n! , and the Banzhaf value, for whichpk =
1
2n−1 , for all 16 k 6 n. (For an elabo-
rate discussion of this class of utility structures we also refer to Weber [40].)
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